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Traditionalism, Secularism, and the 
Transformative Dimension of 
Religious Institutions 
W. Cole Durham, Jr.* 
Alexander Dushku** 
Religious organizations and institutions are among the 
most s i g d k a n t  "mediating structures" situated between 
individuals and the "megastructures" of state and society.' 
This is a natural reflection of the wider influence of religion as 
one of the most profound organizing and nourishing forces 
shaping individuals, community, and culture. Religion cannot 
help but be thought of as a pervasive and vital aspect of social 
life, particularly if one conceives of religion expansively as 
embracing the multitudinous frames of reference that human 
beings use to organize their understanding of social reality and 
the cosmos. Stated differently, religion and Weltanschauung 
constitute a crucial medium in which the dialectic of individual 
and community unfolds. In Robert Cover's words, "[tlhe 
normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
A.B. 1972, Harvard College; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School. 
** Fellow, College of Public Interest Law, Pacific Legal Foundation. B.A. 1990, 
Brigham Young University; J.D. 1993, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham 
Young University. The views expressed here are not necessarily tho& of the Pacific 
Legal Foundation. The authors wish to express appreciation to Shawn G u ~ a r s o n  
and other members of the B.Y.U. Law Review for their patience and valuable 
suggestions. 
1. The contrast between "mediating structures" and "megastructures* is used 
here in the suggestive sense originally advanced by Peter Berger and Richard John 
Neuhaus. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: TIIE 
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2, 3 (1977). The reference is to 
the contrast between those human-sized institutions such as the church, the family, 
the neighborhood, workplace organizations, and schools, which help mitigate and 
reduce the sense of alienation of modern life, and the massive governmental 
institutions and bureaucracies that are so often the source of the alienation. 
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 commitment^,"^ and it is religion broadly conceived that 
generates and sustains those commitments. 
By "dialectic of individual and community" we mean the 
dynamic interaction of social and rhetorical structures 
revolving around, mediating, and sometimes resolving tensions 
between individuals and the larger community. At the level of 
society, one pole of this dialectic is the recognition that social 
cohesion demands that individual members of society share 
some base set of common understandings and beliefs. In the 
words of Alexis de Tocqueville, 
[Nlo society could prosper without such beliefs, or rather that 
there are no societies which manage in that way. For without 
ideas in common, no common action would be possible, and 
without common action, men might exist, but there could be 
no body social. So for society to exist and, even more, for 
society to prosper, it is essential that all the minds of the 
citizens should always be rallied and held together by some 
leading ideas; and that could never happen unless each of 
them sometimes came to draw his opinions from the same 
source and was ready to accept some beliefs ready made.' 
Russell Kirk has pushed Tocqueville's conclusion even further, 
claiming that 
[Ulntil human beings are tied together by some common faith, 
and share certain moral principles, they prey upon one 
another. In the common worship of the cult, a community 
forms. At the heart of every culture is a body of ethics, of 
distinctions between good and evil; and in the beginning, a t  
least, those distinctions are founded upon the authority of 
, revealed religion. Not until a people have come to share 
religious belief are they able to work together satisfactorily, 
or even to make sense of the world in which they find 
them~elves.~ 
Secular pluralists would no doubt disagree with Kirk about the 
scope of the needed "common faith." But that disagreement 
would have been unthinkable before the American experiment 
with religious liberty. Until then, the need for common beliefs 
2. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1983). 
3. ALWs DE 'I~CQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 433-34 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (1966). 
4. RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 14 (1991). 
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was taken to be axiomatic and implied the need for enforced 
religious homogeneity, typically in the form of an established 
church. Prior to the American experience, the Lockean insight 
that toleration would unlock centripetal forces (emanating from 
the gratitude of tolerated dissenters) that would help stabilize 
a regime, rather than unmanageable centrifugal forces that 
would sunder it, remained at best plausible t h e ~ r y . ~  
Note that assumptions about the necessity of an 
integrating set of shared beliefs retain plausibility in pluralistic 
settings at two levels. First, there is the residual "lowest 
common denominator" notion implicit in ideas such as 
Rawlsian "overlapping consensusn6 or in appeals to putatively 
neutral benchmarks such as the notion of "secular purposes" 
for governmental a ~ t i o n . ~  Second, integrating beliefs play a 
significant role in shaping the subgroups that are the 
constituents of a pluralistic society. Shared beliefs are often a 
fundamental aspect of what defines a group and differentiates 
it from others. I t  is also worth noting that the pressure for 
social cohesion (i.e., support for common beliefs and 
homogeneity) can take both the  negative form of 
marginalization of the unorthodox8 and the positive form of 
consolidation and reinforcement of the "common conscience.'* 
The other pole of the dialectic stands opposed to pressures 
for homogeneity. It calls for pluralism and for protection of 
religious autonomy and diversity on the part of both 
individuals and groups.1° The persuasiveness of this call has 
5. JOHN LOCKE, A L ~ E R  CONCERNING TOLERATION 55 (2d ed., Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. 1955) (1689). 
6. JOHN RAWLS, POLPICAL LIBERALISM 39-40, 133-72 (1993). 
7. Thus, the now dilapidated but recurringly invoked Lemon test for 
Establishment Clause violations attempts to ascertain state neutrality in religious 
affairs by inquiring, in the first prong of a tripartite test, whether challenged state 
action has a "secular purpose." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 
S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The 
underlying assumption is that secular purposes are cognitively accessible to 
everyone and constitute a neutral core of shared common sense values on which 
agreement (or agreement to agree) can be obtained in a secular polity. 
8. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 723- 
29 (1986). 
9. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DMSION OF LABOR 108-09 (George Simpson trans., 
Free Press 1966) (1893). 
10. Protection of individual religious autonomy is a central thrust of the 
protection of religious liberty, both in national constitutional law and the 
international law of human rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; GRUNDGE~ER 
[Constitution] [GG] art. 4 (F.R.G.); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, GA. Res. 22004 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at  52, 55, UN. 
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earned for religious liberty a high position in the pantheon of 
fundamental human rights, albeit one that is exposed to the 
weather and constantly subject to  the threat of erosion. 
Religious liberty protections are apparent in international 
human rights i n s t r~ rnen t s ,~~  constitutional  provision^,^^ 
statutes governing the creation of legal entities such as 
religious ~orporations,~~ special exemptions afforded religious 
activity,'* and, generally, in the special significance that 
- - -- 
Doc. N6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976) (art. 18) [hereinafter Civil and 
Political Covenant]. At both levels there is increasing recognition that protection of 
religious life necessarily entails protection of religious communities, and this in 
turn requires protection of group rights and institutional autonomy. Frederick M. 
Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurispndace of Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 
99, 166-69; W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Dallin H. Oaks, Constitutional Protections for 
Independent Higher Education: Limited Powers and Znstitutiod Rights, in 
ACCOUNTABK~IY-KEEPING FAITH WITH ONE ANOTHER 69, 78-86 (1980). 
11. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 10, at  55 (art. 18); [European] 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), as amended by 
Protocol Nos. 3 & 5 [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention of 
Human Rights, 0A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at  1, OEAIser. LNA.23, doc. rev. 2 
(entered into force July 18, 1978); Concluding Document of the V i e ~ a  Meeting 
1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act 
Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, Jan. 17, 1989, 28 1.L.M. 527, 534 
(1989) ( V i e ~ a  Concluding Document). 
12. See, e.g., CONSTITUCI~N arts. 14, 19, 20 (Argentina); AUSTL. CONST. § 116; 
BUNDES-VERFAS~NGSGES~ art. 7, 4 1 (Austria); CONSTITUICAO FEDERAL art. 5 
(Brazil); CAN. CONST. pt. I, $ 2 (Constitution Act 1982) (Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms); CONSTITUCI~N POL~TICA arts. 13, 18, 19 (Colombia); SUOMI 
HALLm SMUOTO arts. 9, 83 (Finland); C O N S P ~ I O N  arts. 2, 77 (France); 
GRUNDGESETZ art. 4 (Germany); INDIA CONST. arts. 15, 16, 25, 26; ISR. CONST. 
$4 7, 22; C o s r r m r z ~ o ~ ~  arts. 8, 19, 20 (Italy); KENPO arts. 19, 20 (Japan); KENYA 
CONST. art. 78; MALTA CONST. art. 40; Co~s r rmr r ro~  art. 23 (Monaco); STATLTUT 
VOOR HET KoNINKRLJK DER NEDERLANDEN art. 6 (Netherlands); CONSTI'MJCI~N arts. 
34, 35 (Panama); CONSTITUCI~N art. 70 (Paraguay); CONSlTTUICAO FEDERAL art. 41 
(Portugal); CONSTITUCI~N art. 16 (Spain); BuNDESVERFASUNG arts. 27, 49, 50 
(Switz); TURK. CONST. art. 24; CONSTITUTION art. 17 (Zaire). English translations 
available in ALBEWr P. BLAUSTEIN ET AL., RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE WORLD'S 
CONS~ITUTIONS (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with W. Cole Durham, Jr.). 
13. See, e.g., CAL. COW. CODE $0 9110-9690 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1993) 
(California Religious Corporations Act); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 
$9 1.40(30), 1.80, 2.02(a)(2)(iii) (1987) (defining "religious corporation," listing the 
constitutional protections enjoyed by religious corporations, and requiring the 
articles of incorporation to state whether a corporation fits the definition of 
"religious corporation"). 
14. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting children from 
mandatory school attendance laws); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) 
(sustaining tax exemptions); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) 
(exempting religious believers from military service); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) (accommodating sabbatarian work schedules); CONSCIENTIOUS 
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contemporary legal systems attach to laws that affect religious 
life and religious institutions. 
Within this dialectical force field, complex narratives 
unfold. An apt comment by Edwin Gaustad on American 
religious history could well be extended to this domain: "[iln 
the beginning was complexity, and the complexity has 
endured."15 Indeed, the complexity has increased over time. 
Our aim in this Article is to reflect on one of the fundamental 
influences shaping this highly complex and interactive process: 
the opposition between traditionalist and secularist 
orientations. In our view, this constitutes one of the deepest 
tensions shaping the legal environment of religious 
intermediary institutions.16 To a large extent, the conceptual 
categories and legal doctrines we use to think about the role of 
religious intermediary institutions derive from a social setting 
in which the fundamental problems grew out of internecine 
rivalries between diverse religious groups. But increasingly, it 
is the divide between traditionalists and secularists that 
constitutes the fundamental challenge for pluralism in 
contemporary society. In this transformed context, one can no 
longer assume that ,secular ground will constitute a neutral 
domain where resolution of religious tensions can occur and 
where the basis for a common life can be found. From the 
traditionalist perspective, secular ground has become suspect 
and, indeed, threatening. 
In this Article, we first examine the traditionalist- 
secularist tension in a number of settings that suggest the 
depth and range of its influence on intermediary institutions 
(Section I), and then address some of the factors that shape 
individual and societal responses to religious institutions 
OBJECTIONS IN THE EC COUNTRIES (European Consortium for Church-State 
Research ed., 1992) (reporting similar legal exemptions from throughout the 
European Community). 
15. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 3 (1987). 
16. Ironically, there is a sense in which this tension is an outgrowth of 
religious belief and the resulting dynamics of religious pluralism. As Owen 
Chadwick argued in his Gifford Lectures, "Christian conscience was the force which 
began to make Europe 'secular.'" OWEN CHADWICK, THE SECULARIZATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN MIND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) 
(1975). The call of conscience created forces which eventually led to pressures "to 
allow many religions or no religion in a state, and [to] repudiate any kind of 
pressure upon the man who rejected the accepted . . . axioms of society." Id. For 
another analysis of dialectic tensions of religious liberty and social coherence, see 
Ashby D. Boyle, Fear and Trembling at the Court: Dimensions of Understanding in 
the Supreme Court's Religion Jurisprudence, 3 S ~ N  HALL  CON^. L.J. 55 (1993). 
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(Section 11). We then analyze what we view as the betrayal of 
free exercise and ambivalence about accommodation in the 
Religion Clause jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court (Section 111). Finally, we analyze some of the dangers of 
wooden separationism and the more general hazards of 
epistemologically privileging the secular (Section IV). 
If our argument is correct, one of the most crucial roles 
played by religious intermediary institutions is their capacity 
to transform mundane aspects of everyday secular existence, 
infusing them with meaning and transcendent significance. The 
ability of religious institutions to perform this role is 
profoundly important for social life, and yet dangerously 
fragile. Religious organizations need to be given space and 
sensitive protection if they are to make the generative and 
regenerative contribution to social life that they (and in many 
respects, they alone) can make. As important as the impulse to 
find and develop common discourses in society is, this goal 
cannot be pursued a t  the cost of the institutions that generate 
transformative, uncommon discourse. 
I. THE TRADITIONALIST-SECULARIST TENSION AS THE 
FUNDAMENTAZ, TENSION SHAPING THE INTERACTION OF LAW 
AND RELIGIOUS INTERMEDIARY ASSOCIATIONS 
The influence and vitality of religious traditions varies in 
intensity and impact among cultures and within a particular 
culture over time. These changes occur in response to 
contingencies over which a particular tradition has little 
control. Wars of survival or conquest, drought and famine, 
persecution, and a seemingly endless array of other such 
factors may sap or strengthen the vitality of a religious 
tradition. The presence of charismatic spiritual leaders, able 
scholars, or a receptive populace may lead to periods of 
flourishing. Religious traditions may undergo significant 
regeneration as old beliefs and practices are found applicable to 
new circumstances. Conversely, periods of peace and material 
prosperity may lull a nation into a sense of material 
complacency in which religion is neglected. Under such 
conditions the spiritual strength of a religious community may 
wane as the religious tradition recedes from cultural primacy. 
Such changes assure that the environment of religious 
intermediary institutions remains in constant flux. This in turn 
results in explicit revision of legal norms and, more subtly, in 
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shifting shades of meaning as the changing pattern of events 
casts new light on the legal landscape. 
Even without overt forces driving a culture toward or away 
from religious traditionalism, there appears to be an innate 
tension between religious and more secular world views in 
virtually all cultures. This tension reflects a deeper dialectic 
within each human being. Sir Thomas Browne, writing in the 
1600s, was surely not the first to note the tension between the 
"speculative mind eager for knowledge and the devout spirit 
moved by faith."17 Projected outward from the individual into 
culture, these competing forces manifest themselves with 
varying degrees of predominance in a society's institutions and 
culture. Moreover, different subcommunities in a particular 
society may be more influenced by one orientation than the 
other. Certainly the legal and scientific elites of recent 
generations have tended to be more secularist than 
traditionalist. 
A. The MainelDiamond Debate: Toward an Interactive 
Model of the Traditionalist-Secularist Dialectic 
During the 19th century, it became commonplace to think 
of the movement of intellectual history as a shift from tradi- 
tionalist to secularist attitudes. One thinks, for example, of 
Auguste Comte's beliefs that every science and every society 
must move through theological and metaphysical stages on the 
way to achieving the stage of positive science.18 
Sir Henry Maine's account of legal history reflects similar 
assumptions. He viewed the relationship between religion and 
law as an evolving one that progressed from a general fusion of 
law and religion in customary societies to increasing separation 
of the two domains. In  his words, "There is no system of record- 
ed law, literally from China to Peru, which, when it first 
emerges into notice, is not seen t o  be entangled with religious 
ritual and observance."lg But the "path of progress moves, ac- 
17. LEONARD NATHANSON, THE STRATEGY OF TRUTH: A STUDY OF SIR THOMAS 
BROWNE 109 (1967). See generally SIR THOMAS BROWNE, RELIGIO hlEDICI AND 
OTHER W R ~ I N G S  (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1642) (arguing that religion and 
science can coexist harmoniously in the individual and in society). 
18. 1 AUGUSTE COMTE, THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE 3 (Hani- 
et Martineau trans., 1896). 
19. HENRY MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSMM 5 (London, 
Spottiswoode and Co. 1891); see W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religion and the Criminal 
Law: Types and Contexts of Interaction, in THE WEIGHTIER MA'ITERS OF THE LAW: 
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cording to Maine, from this primitive blurring of law and reli- 
gion toward more sophisticated systems in which the realms of 
law and religion are more clearly delineated."20 In this view, 
law evolves (that is, improves) from being heavily infused with 
religion in primitive societies to a more secular configuration. 
Thus religion is "an important co-founder of. . . law, but one 
whose contribution can be dispensed with once a more ad- 
vanced stage of civilization is attained.'"' 
In reality the relation of the secular and the religious sides 
of law is much more complex. As A.S. Diamond was able to 
show by 1935, Maine's account of the fusion of religion and law 
in primitive societies relied on overly simplistic inferences 
drawn from the mere concatenation of religious and secular 
matters i n  legal materials.22 Diamond's view was that aside 
from obvious areas of interconnection, such as the domain of 
sacral crimes and the institution of 0ath-swearing,2~ ancient 
law was no more religious than modern law. But this view was 
also an oversimplification, this time erring on the secularist 
side. 
What the MainefDiamond debate exemplifies is the tenden- 
cy to conceive of the respective roles of traditionalism and secu- 
larism in the formation of a cultural norm as an "either-or" 
proposition: either the criminal law originates from and is 
infused with religiosity, or  its roots are primarily secular. The 
picture seems t o  be that secularists and the traditionalists are 
engaged i n  a long-term struggle for hegemony in which the 
winner takes all. Yet, "[tlhe reality is that the . . . law may be 
both religious and secular a t  the same time, or that individuals 
within a particular culture may see it, at alternating moments, 
as one and then the other and then the other again.7724 Seen in 
this light, the traditionalist-secularist polarity is not so much a 
clue to the teleology of history as a permanent tension in hu- 
man affairs. 
Few of us are wholly secular or wholly religious in our 
outlooks. Rather we tend to shift in and out of these modes of 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION 193, 197 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander 
eds., 1988). 
20. Durham, supra note 19, at 197. 
21. Id. 
22. See A.S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW PAST AND PRESENT 45 (Methuen & Co. 
1971) (1935). 
23. I d  at 47. 
24. Durham, supra note 19, at 199. 
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perceiving reality, at times finding ourselves under the influ- 
ence of religion and at others more susceptible to the secularist 
perspective. Therefore, instead of analyzing a n  individual or 
community as either religious or secular, a more accurate mod- 
el would conceive of individuals and communities as being i n  
constant motion along a spectrum extending from the  purely 
religious to the purely secular, and continuously vacillating 
toward or away from one or the other extreme. 
Clifford Geertz's commentary on the debate between L6vy- 
Bruhl and Malinowski concerning the nature of "native 
thought" captures the point we wish to make. L6vy-Bruhl inter- 
preted native thought primarily in mystic t e r m ~ , ~ ~  whereas 
Malinowski interpreted it in  a more secular, rationalist man- 
ner.26 Geertz, however, insightfully perceived that  both were 
overlooking the ability of natives-and all individuals-to be 
both secular and mystical i n  their outlooks. Geertz's analysis of 
this debate is worth quoting at length. 
The movement back and forth between the religious perspec- 
tive and the common-sense perspective i s  actually one of the 
more obvious empirical occurrences on the social scene, 
though, again, one of the most neglected by social anthropolo- 
gists, virtually all of whom have seen it happen countless 
times. Religious belief has usually been presented as a homo- 
geneous characteristic of an individual, like his place of resi- 
dence, his occupational role, his kinship position, and so on. 
But religious belief in the midst of ritual, where i t  engulfs the 
total person, transporting him, so far as he is concerned, into 
another mode of existence, and religious belief as the pale, 
remembered reflection of that experience in the midst of ev- 
eryday life are not precisely the same thing, and the failure to 
realize this has led to some confusion, most especially in con- 
nection with the so-called primitive-mentality problem. Much 
of the difficulty between LBvy-Bruhl and Malinowski on the 
nature of "native thought," for example, arises from a lack of 
full recognition of this distinction; for where the French phi- 
losopher was concerned with the view of reality savages 
adopted when taking a specifically religious perspective, the 
Polish-English ethnographer was concerned with that which 
they adopted when taking a strictly common-sense one. Both 
25. LUCIEN L~w-BRUHL, HOW NATIVES THINK 35-68 (Lilian A. Clare trans., 
1926). 
26. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE AND RELIGION AND OTHER ESSAYS 
17-87 (1948). 
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perhaps vaguely sensed that they were not talking about 
exactly the same thing, but where they went astray was in 
failing to give a specific accounting of the way in which these 
two forms of "thought"-or, as  I would rather say, these two 
modes of symbolic formulations-interacted, so that where 
Levy-Bruhl's savages tended to live, despite his postludial 
disclaimers, in a world composed entirely of mystical encoun- 
ters, Malinowski's tended to live, despite his stress on the 
functional importance of religion, in a world composed entire- 
ly of practical actions. They became reductionists (an idealist 
is as  much of a reductionist as a materialist) in  spite of them- 
selves because they failed to see man as  moving more or less 
easily, and very frequently, between radically contrasting 
ways of looking at the world, ways which are not continuous 
with one another but separated by cultural gaps across which 
Kierkegaardian leaps must be made in both directions . . . ." 
This passage suggests the need, in analyzing the tensions be- 
tween traditionalist and secularist conceptual paradigms, t o  
take account of the innumerable ways in which these Gestalt- 
type switches between religious and nonreligious orientations 
occur and to  acknowledge that such switches are a natural and 
vital aspect of individual and social life. 
Indeed, one of the critical values of religious mediating 
structures may be that they facilitate precisely this human 
ability to move back and forth between religious and nonreli- 
gious orientations. In a deep sense, it is precisely the capacity 
to infuse secular phenomena with deeper meaning that makes 
religious institutions so significant. Furthermore, if this capaci- 
ty is a significant aspect of the justification of religious liberty, 
a thoroughly secularist interpretation of religious liberty is 
likely to prove defective by remaining blind in its very nature 
to this critical transformative process that religious liberty is 
designed to  protect. 
B. The Tension Between Traditionalist and Secularist 
Orientations at the Foundation of Liberal Theory 
John Locke's 2"Wo Treatises of Government provide another 
illustration of the tension between religious traditionalism and 
secularism, this time at the foundations of classical liberalism. 
In these two works Locke unleashes a secularist attack upon 
27. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERP~ATION 
OF CULTURES 87, 119-20 (1973) (footnotes omitted). 
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entrenched medieval religious and political traditions, especial- 
ly as those traditions had been recently articulated in Sir Rob- 
ert Filmer's work, P a t r i a r ~ h a . ~ ~  Locke targeted the doctrine of 
the divine right of kings in his First Treatise, inflicting a devas- 
tating blow. From our modern perspective, particularly with 
the advent of feminism, it is tempting to view Filmer's argu- 
ment for absolute monarchy and patriarchalism as easily refut- 
able and hence to suspect that Locke merely used Filmer as a 
convenient antagonist t o  illustrate the obvious superiority of 
his own theories. But this was hardly the case. Far from being 
Locke's whipping boy, Filmer's scripturally-grounded 
patriarchalism was considered at  the time to be even more 
formidable and threatening (at least to liberal secularists) than 
the absolutism of Hobbes's Leviathan. The power of Filmer's 
perspective came from its traditionalist roots. In Stuart Eng- 
land, the biblical injunction to "Honor thy father and thy moth- 
er" was extended to encompass obedience and loyalty to the 
king and his  magistrate^.^' Similar patriarchal notions in 
England can be traced a t  least to  the time of Edward VL30 
Against the divine right of kings, Locke deployed his version of 
the law of nature-essentially the law of empiricist reason. 
Reason, Locke opined, reveals that there is nothing more obvi- 
ous than that "[clreatures of the same species and rank promis- 
cuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use 
of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another 
without Subordination or S~bjection."~' Reasoning from this 
"self-evident" postulate of human equality, Locke developed his 
theory of social contract, arguing that the only legitimate basis 
of government is the consent of the governed. 
The point here is that there is a tension between tradition- 
alist assumptions and the very foundations of liberal theory. 
28. SIR ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA ND OTHER W R ~ I N G S  ( J o h a ~  
P .  Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680). 
29. GORDON J. SCHOCHET, THE AUTHORITARIAN FAMILY AND POLITICAL kl'l"lT- 
TUDES IN 17TH CENTURY ENGLAND: PATRJARCHALISM N POLITICAL THOUGHT 6 
(1988); see W .  Cole Durham, Jr., Comment: The Relationship of Constitution and 
Tradition, 53 SO. CAL. L. REV. 645, 646 (1980). 
30. Durham, supra note 29, at 646. 
31. JOHN LOCRE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 309 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (3d ed. 
1698); see generally Robert A. Goldwin, John Lock,  in HIS~ORY OF POLITICAL PHI- 
LOSOPHY 477 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) (surveying Locke's 
argument that government has limited powers and exists only by consent of the 
governed). 
432 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNrVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
This is not to say that the two are necessarily mutually exclu- 
sive. After all, it was Locke himself who first clearly recognized 
that the legitimacy and stability of a political regime could be 
enhanced by tolerating a range of religious outlooks.32 But a t  
least some highly secularized versions of liberalism conflict 
sharply with traditionalist assumptions. Even more problemat- 
ic, such unduly anti-traditionalist approaches can lead to the 
unintended erosion of the intermediary institutions that nour- 
ish and contribute to the development of the individuals who 
ultimately assert Lockean rights. 
A contemporary version of this tension has resurfaced in 
-Michael Sandel's critique of Rawlsian l ibera l i~m.~~ The prob- 
lem with Rawlsian theory, according to Sandel, lies with its 
premise that "unencumbered selveP4 choose the fundamental 
principles of justice from behind a "veil of ignorance."35 This 
premise necessarily ignores the contribution that influences 
such as tradition and religion have on the formation of individ- 
ual character and personhood. The result is that Rawlsian 
liberalism is skewed toward atomizing individualism from the 
beginning and cannot adequately account for the significance of 
religion and tradition in social life. The practical consequence 
of this bias is that insufficient attention is paid to protecting 
the intermediary institutions that perform the critical nurtur- 
ing role that excessively individualist liberalism leaves out of 
its account. At the level of legal doctrine, this can lead to a 
view that sacrifices fragile intermediary institutions in the 
process of rigorously enforcing individual rights.36 
32. See LOCKE, supra note 5, at 55. 
33. Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. 
Sandel ed., 1984); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUS~ICE 
(1982). 
34. Sandel, CRITICS, supra note 33, at 5. 
35. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS~ICE 12, 136-42 (1971). 
36. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 109-20 (1991). This view has not prevailed at a number of critical junc- 
tures in religious liberty adjudication in the United States, but it has certainly had 
forceful advocates. In Wisconsin u. Yoder, for example, Justice Douglas in dissent 
urged sacrificing the patterns of education necessary for the survival of the Amish 
community to the "right" of Amish minors to secular education that would be valu- 
able to them if they chose to leave the Amish community. 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 
(1972). Similarly, an underlying question in the Amos case was whether the right 
of religious organizations to structure their own internal affairs, including work 
relationships, should give way to general equalitarian norms of non-discrimination. 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Liberal norms 
have had the most success overriding traditionalist approaches in Native American 
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C. The Tension Between Secular and Religious Perspectives in 
the Debate over Family Values and Children's Rights 
Still another situation where we can observe the tension 
between religious and secular perspectives is in the debate over 
family values and children's rights. In a thoughtful article 
wrestling with this tension, Professor Bruce Hafen identifies 
two strands running through American family law: an individu- 
al rights orientation and a tradition protective of the 
In many ways, these two approaches to family law are simply 
modern analogues to the tension between Lockean liberalism 
and Filmer's traditionalism. Again, they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, though excessive acceptance of the rhetoric 
of rights can lead to erosion of traditional family structures. 
Recognizing that the integrity of the family tradition, including 
parental. authority, is often essential to the individual and 
social development of children, Hafen argues: 
[Ilndividualism must remain embedded in the context of its 
corollary obligations to family and community if the individu- 
al tradition itself is to survive in a meaningfbl form . . . . 
[Tlhere is no serious evidence that society has outgrown the 
need for the preparat& role of the family tradition, nor has 
industrial society discovered substitute institutions or rela- 
tionships adequate to fulfill the functions historically per- 
formed by the family.38 
Therefore, the argument proceeds, it is preferable that children 
serve an apprenticeship to parental authority rather than being 
prematurely abandoned to abstract autonomy rights. 
Such sentiments are deeply embedded in the Judeo-Chris- 
tian tradition as well as in the religious traditions of other 
cultures.39 But increasingly, such traditionalist outlooks are 
challenged by secularist forces in the children's rights move- 
contexts. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. North- 
west Indian Cemeterj Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
37. Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some 
Reservations About Abadoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 
610-30. 
38. Id. at 657. 
39. One example of this traditional sentiment in a non-Western culture is the 
Confucian notion of filial piety, which likewise reinforces the traditional obligations 
of children to parents. Confucius, Analects ¶ql 56-60 in 1 SOURCES OF CHINESE 
TRADITION 27-28 (W. Theodore de Bary ed. & W. Theodore de Bary et al. compil- 
ers, 1965). 
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ment. Secularist advocates urge that children's rights should 
clearly prevail over parental interests in order t o  protect chil- 
dren from the authoritarianism and patriarchalism of the fami- 
ly. For these advocates, child "liberation" is an important goal. 
One commentator went so far as to suggest, 
[Alsking what is good for children is beside the point. We will 
grant children rights for the same reason we grant rights to 
adults, not because we are sure that children will then be- 
come better people, but more for ideological reasons, because 
we believe that expanding freedom as a way of life is worth- 
while in itself.40 
Another writer claimed that "the family's vital role in authori- 
tarianism is  entirely repugnant to the free soul in our age.'741 
This same author supported a restructuring of society along 
radical secularist lines for the benefit of children.42 
Few would dispute that some situations warrant interven- 
tion in dysfunctional families for the %est interests of the 
child." But thoughtless pursuit of rights for rights' sake, with- 
out thought about the deeper impacts on the larger role of the 
family in society, seems u n ~ a r r a n t e d . ~ ~  Such positions are 
diametrically opposed to  traditionalist conceptions of .society 
and family. When these two perspectives and their correspond- 
ing social prescriptions are viewed along side each other, one 
can observe the theoretical and policy conflicts that emerge 
from the deep tensions between traditional religious convictions 
and more secular outlooks. 
D. The Traditionalist-Secularist Tension as the General 
Gravitational Force Field Defining the 
Environment of Intermediary Institutions 
The examples provided to this point are isolated examples 
of a much wider rift between secularist and traditionalist world 
views that James Davison Hunter has described with the 
phrase "culture  war^.'"^ Hunter argues that American society 
40. RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGIITS 31 (1974). 
41. Paul Adams, The Infant, the Family and Society, in CHILDREN'S R I G ~ S  51, 
52 (Paul Goodman ed., 1971). 
42. Id. at 76. Adams proposed "to end war as an institution; then to eliminate 
poverty; then racism; and finally to put an end to the meaninglessness of living in 
a bureaucratized society." Id. 
43. See GLENDON, supm note 36, at 121-30, 136-38. 
44. JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS xi-xii (1991). 
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is experiencing a deep polarization between what he calls the 
"orthodox" (traditionalist) and "progressive" (secularist) sides of 
American culture.45 Hunter traces the "nub" of present dis- 
agreements over a wide variety of social issues to differing 
conceptions of the source of moral authority.46 By "orthodox" 
(or what he calls "the impulse toward orthodoxy"), Hunter 
refers to  "the commitment on the part of adherents to an exter- 
nal, definable, and transcendent authority."47 Usually ortho- 
doxy entails some belief in God as the creator and sustainer of 
a universally applicable moral order. Adherents of the orthodox 
orientation tend to be religious conservatives, though they often 
come from a broad range of very different religious traditions. 
What unites them is the belief that a transcendent authority 
defines "what is good, what is true, how we should live, and 
who we are.'"" Being transcendent and fixed, such authority is 
also "sufficient for all time."49 
In contrast, Hunter defines the "progressivist impulse" as 
the "tendency to  resymbolize historic faiths according to the 
prevailing assumptions of contemporary life."50 Progressivists 
are not necessarily irreligious, and in this sense, our "tradition- 
alist-secularist" dichotomy does not exactly track Hunter's 
orthododprogressive dichotomy. The advantage of his terminol- 
ogy is that it accounts for the frequent alignment of the liberal 
wing of many religious denominations with what are otherwise 
essentially secularist positions. We prefer the "traditionalist- 
secularistn description of the divide because we think it more 
accurately indicates the source o r  grounding of normative or- 
dering in the two orientations, as well as the underlying sourc- 
es of tension. Moreover, characterizing the secularist side as 
"progressive" affords the secularists what traditionalists would 
regard as an unfairly favorable (and certainly non-neutral) 
label. 
While Hunter's "progressives" may be religious, they have 
a "strong tendency to translate the moral ideals of a religious 
tradition so that they conform to and legitimate the contempo- 
rary ~eitgeist."~~ Consequently, moral authority for them is 
45. Id. at  43-46. 
46. Id. at 42-43. 
47. Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis omitted). 
51. Id. at 44. 
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more "defmed by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of ratio- 
nalism and s~bjectivism,"~~ than i t  is by the spirit of tradition 
and religious authority. In fact, "truth tends to be viewed as a 
process, as a reality that is ever unfolding."5s As a result, 
[tlhe traditional sources of moral authority, whether scrip- 
ture, papal pronouncements, or Jewish law, no longer have an 
exclusive or even a predominant binding power over [the lives 
of progressivistsl. Rather, the binding moral authority tends 
to reside in personal experience or scientific rationality, or 
either of these in conversation with particular religious or 
cultural  tradition^.^^ 
As progressivist and orthodox ways of interpreting the 
world increasingly clash, a historic cultural realignment is 
occurring. Protestants, Catholics, and Jews have long disagreed 
over matters of scriptural interpretation and religious authori- 
ty. Inter- and intra-sect strife has been a feature of American 
cultural life from the nation's beginning. But now the lines are 
being fundamentally redrawn. "At the heart of the new cultural 
realignment are the pragmatic alliances being formed across 
faith  tradition^"^^ to oppose the cultural advance of 
progressivist and secularist social visions. As a result of this 
realignment, we are observing in America an increased 
politicization of the tension between pervasively secular views 
and traditional religious conceptions of moral authority and the 
good. 
During the 1980s, secularists were quick to criticize the 
rise and political engagement of the religious right. But those 
same secularists were slow to recognize that the hazards of 
political divisiveness and possible political disintegration no 
longer emanated from sectarian divisions, but from the reli- 
gious/secular divide itself. Before the transformation described 
by Hunter, secular positions and interests provided a relatively 
neutral common ground where citizens from divergent belief 
systems could come together. Now it is the non-neutrality of 
the secular ground that is precisely the problem. Consider what 
this means about the Lemon test--one of the critical doctrinal 
vehicles for articulating the meaning of religious liberty in the 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 45. 
55. Id. at 47. 
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United States. Under the first prong of the Lemon test, a state 
action must have a secular purpose to comply with the Non- 
Establishment Clause.56 One of the deep problems of the cul- 
ture wars in which we are enmeshed is that in many areas 
secular purposes are profoundly n0n-neutral,5~ and it is secu- 
lar purposes that religious groups most fear. A central chal- 
lenge in the current situation is that believers in our soci- 
ety-and we emphasize that it is not just believers in unusual 
or marginal groups, but the "orthodox" across the board-are 
feeling threatened by the course of secularization. 
11. THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONALIST AND SECULARIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON ATTITUDES TOWARD RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
A. Different Conceptions of Religious Traditionalism 
As in all other contexts of group interaction (family, 
workplace, neighborhood, school, etc.), religious influence can 
have both brighter and darker sides. By its nature, religion 
entails moral authority; and moral authority may be employed 
for good or ill. Typically, then, positions along the traditional- 
ist/secularist divide vary according to personal experiences with 
religion. For some, religion is a source of transcendence, com- 
munion, and positive character formation. For these, religion 
furnishes spiritual possibilities: revelation, divine authority, 
miracles, saints and sinners, heaven and hell, and so on. By 
teaching moral absolutes in a world dominated by relativism, 
religion serves to remind the believer that life transcends rea- 
son and the present. In a religious world view, mortal existence 
becomes moral existence and life assumes universal meaning. 
Where individuals associate in organized religious communi- 
ties, places of worship become meeting places where believers 
can congregate, renew their faith, and regain hope. Religious 
communities provide the social structures within which free 
individuals find themselves and explore the depth of their hu- 
manity. 
However, for others religious influence has been experi- 
enced as a form of oppression, or superstition. For these indi- 
viduals, religion--especially traditional religion-is seen as 
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
57. Kent Greenawalt argues, for instance, that purely rational approaches are 
unable by themselves to resolve many of society's deepest questions. KENT 
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 98-172 (1988). 
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tyrannical and virtually always authoritarian. One feminist 
author has suggested, for instance, that religion unjustly de- 
fines male-female relationships. 
The Judaic-Christian tradition has served t o  legitimate sexu- 
ally imbalanced patriarchal society. Thus, for example, the 
image of Father God, spawned in the human imagination and 
sustained as plausible by patriarchy, has in turn rendered 
service to this type of society by making its mechanisms for 
the oppression of women appear right and fitting.58 
Thus religion creates and preserves a power structure within 
which women (and children) are more readily abused-physi- 
cally, emotionally, and sexually. From this perspective the 
tyranny of religion extends beyond the mere sacralization of 
female oppression. With its universalist morality, religion at- 
tempts to compress all existence into pre-defined categories of 
right and wrong, natural and unnatural. As a result, human 
experimentation and diversity, individual self-actualization, 
and even true spiritual expression are suppressed. Hence reli- 
gion is associated with a totalitarian approach to life. Further, 
religion tends to be perceived as a set of quaint superstitions 
that are neither empirically grounded nor logically defensible. 
As a result, religious ideas are easily manipulable by those 
desiring to preserve and enhance the power of religious and 
social hierarchies. 
B. Different Experiences with Religious Traditionalism 
Shape Political Views of Church and State 
These two opposing attitudes tend to generate different 
attitudes toward traditionalist and secularist perspectives of 
culture, society, and politics. Of course, as Geertz points out, 
few people completely adhere to either of these two orienta- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Rather, personal attitudes toward traditionalist mores 
and social prescriptions differ and no doubt fluctuate in com- 
plex ways depending on the nature of one's experience with 
traditional values. Those who experience traditional values as a 
positive influence are much more likely to urge some form of 
state protection of traditionalism. Such individuals may even 
58. Mary Daly, After the Death of God the Father: Women's Liberation and the 
Transformation of Christian Consciousness, in WohlANspIRIT RISING: A FEMINIST 
READER IN RELIGION 53, 54 (Carol P. Christ & Judith Plaskow eds., 1979). 
59. Supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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support the protection of traditional values directly through 
state and community action. For example, traditionalists have 
consistently sought to protect conventional views on sexual 
morality through laws restricting, banning or otherwise com- 
batting pornography,6O nude dancing,6l homosexual con- 
abort ion,63  contraceptive^,^^ a n d  t e e n a g e  
pregnancy.65 The extent to which such efforts to "enforce mor- 
als" are legitimate has, of course, become a central jurispruden- 
tial debate.66 Its centrality is a sign of the depth of the tension 
separating traditionalists from secularists. Wherever one 
stands on the merits of this issue, neutrally resolving the dis- 
pute promises to be a difficult task. 
Beyond protecting traditional values themselves, tradition- 
alists often advocate legal procedures, institutions, and doc- 
trines that protect and preserve the institutions that shelter, 
nourish, and perpetuate these values. The Religion Clauses, 
especially if construed in a manner which focuses on the impor- 
tance of religious intermediary  institution^,^' can play a cru- 
60. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (states have a legitimate inter- 
est in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material). 
61. An ordinance banning nude dancing was recently sustained in Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). Other cases dealing with this issue 
include Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 
U.S. 61 (1981); Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). 
62. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
63. Of course, such laws were invalidated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (19731, 
and its progeny. See, eg., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 
502 (1990) (Akron II); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 
(1989); Thornburgh v. American College. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 
(1983) (Akron n; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464 (1977). The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. 
Ct. 2791 (1992), r ed rmed  the core holding of Roe and has left traditionalists few 
legislative options, except perhaps in areas where state action is designed to per- 
suade rather than coerce women to carry pregnancies to tern. 
64. The Supreme Court struck down regulation of contraceptive use by married 
couples in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965), and extended this holding 
to distribution to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
65. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (sustaining the Adolescent 
Family Life Act of 1982 against facial challenge). 
66. See, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); JOEL 
FEWBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984) (especially 65-70); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO 
SELF (1986); JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1990) (especially 3-38, 124- 
75); JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND 
MORALITY (1963). 
67. The structural approach advocated by Mary AM Glendon and Raul Yanes 
suggests an approach to religion clause jurisprudence that is particularly sensitive 
to the importance of religious liberty as a protector of mediating institutions. See 
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cial role in protecting the fragile meaning-generating structures 
in the social environment. For instance, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder6' the Supreme Court supported the cultural and reli- 
gious traditions of the Old Order Amish when it held that the 
Amish were entitled to an exemption from certain state com- 
pulsory schooling requirements under the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment. On the other hand, as all too many of 
the Supreme Court's Native American cases demonstrate, fail- 
ure to protect such communities can profoundly disrupt a way 
of life.69 
In contrast with those who have had positive experiences 
with traditional values, individuals who have experienced reli- 
gious traditionalism as a negative and oppressive influence are 
more likely to urge control of religious organizations. Some 
with attitudes that trace back to the secular Enlightenment 
exhibit open hostility toward organized religion, viewing it as a 
pillar of the ancien rbgime and its traditionalist heirs or, at  a 
minimum, as a source of disintegration and separatism in con- 
temporary society.70 Their attacks on religion often focus on 
the despotic role they perceive religion to  have played in pre- 
venting people from enjoying their natural rights and using 
their rational minds. Such attitudes are apparent today in 
anxieties about Islamic and Christian fundamentalism and 
other marginal groups such as the U&cation Church, 
Scientology, and Krishna Consciousness. This anxiety often 
results in pressure to invoke state mechanisms to  hassle or 
restrict the activities of such groups, or to urge state non-inter- 
vention in what is euphemistically referred to as "deprogram- 
mi~~g."~l  
Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Ekrcke,  90 MICH. L. REV. 
477, 534-50 (1991). 
68. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
69. See, e g . ,  Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988) (sustaining approval of construction of a government road through land held 
sacred by Native American community, despite an express finding that this would 
destroy the community's way of life). 
70. See generatly JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934). 
71. For the most part, such pressure has not ultimately been successful, but 
deprogramming activities have been a major source of travail for some smaller 
religious groups. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1980); Eilers v. Coy, 582 F. Supp. 1093 @. Minn. 1984). For 
an attempted justification of deprogramming efforts, see Richard Delgado, When 
Religious Exercise Is Not Free: Deprogramming and the Constitutional Status of 
Coercively Induced Belief, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (1984). 
42 11 RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 441 
C. Differing Internal Orientations of Religious Traditions 
Toward Church l State Relations 
In addition to one's experience with religion in general, the 
nature of a particular religious tradition's historical experiences 
and its substantive beliefs can also affect its orientation toward 
the individualist/communitarian divide in diverse ways. Reli- 
gious belief does not necessarily t rans la te  into a 
communitarian orientation. Roger Williams, for example, was 
deeply religious but had radically individualistic beliefs that 
emerged from his theological convictions about the tendency of 
government to corrupt religion.72 Other religious views have 
led to much more communitarian outlooks. Catholic social 
theory, for example, often has a more communitarian cast.73 
Mormonism combines a communitarian orientation born in the 
crucible of the 19th century7* with deep theological beliefs in 
human freedom, especially freedom of con~cience.~~ Such 
blending of diverse strands undercuts simplistic or stereotypi- 
cal analysis. In Mormonism, for example, the hierarchical na- 
ture of priesthood authority is tempered by the belief that the 
divine authority is lost if it is exercised with any degree of 
unjust domination or coercion.76 This permits the needs of the 
religious community for order to be squared with protecting the 
sanctity of the individual. 
In like manner, there are varying secular perspectives 
towards religious traditionalism, ranging from open hostility to 
deep appreciation. From at least the time of the Enlighten- 
ment, some secularists have been deeply suspicious of reli- 
gion-especially organized religion. For some, religious organi- 
zations are simply one more "megastructure" in society, from 
which they feel profoundly alienated. On the other hand, some 
72. MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965). 
73. See, e.g., A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 220 
(1985). 
74. For thoughtful accounts of the tensions between individualism and 
communitarianism in Mormon culture, see LEONARD J. ARRINGTON ET AL., BUKD- 
ING THE CITY OF GOD: COMMUNITY AND COOPERATION AMONG THE MORMONS 15-62 
(1992); EDWIN B. FIRMAGE & R. COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL 
H I S ~ R Y  OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900, at 
48-58 (1988); JAN SHIPPS, MORMONISM: THE STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS TRADITION 
67-86 (1985). 
75. THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LAT- 
TER-DAY SAINTS $ 134 (1981). 
76. Id. $ 121:41-46. 
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secularists are deeply conscious of the kinds of contributions 
that religion makes to  society, believing religion deserves re- 
spect as one of many possible lifestyles that individuals in a 
free society might select. John Rawls and Kent Greenawalt are 
leading figures in this category.77 
D. The Non-neutrality of Neutrality: 
Privileging the Secular Voice 
For reasons that go beyond the scope of this paper, it ap- 
pears that many in academia, the media, and the legal commu- 
nity view religion as oppressive or largely irrelevant to their 
personal lives.78 As a result, a pervasively secular voice domi- 
nates these very influential sectors of American society and 
operates to suppress the voices of religious traditionalism in 
subtle but powerful ways. This leads to a privileging of secular 
outlooks among intellectual elites that discounts other, faith- 
oriented ways of experiencing the world. The practical conse- 
quence is that elites often overlook the needs of religious insti- 
tutions or treat them with insufficient deference and respect. 
Even well-intended secularists often fail to understand the full 
ramifications of some policies they suggest. Yet if, as we con- 
tend, it is precisely by transforming the secular-the mundane 
and the everyday-that religious institutions make many of 
their most central contributions, approaches to religious liberty 
that insist on privileging secular outlooks and bracketing out 
the influence of religion's transformative power necessarily fail 
to protect what is perhaps the most central dimension of 
religiosity. 
One particularly prominent form that secularist attitudes 
toward religion take is an insistence that all participants in 
public discourse use religiously-neutral v~cabulary.'~ The idea 
is that religion is inherently private and subjective, and cannot 
be "understood" in the public market place of ideas. Public 
77. GREENAWALT, supra note 57; RAWLS, supra note 6; RAWS, supm note 35. 
78. GREENAWALT, supra note 57, at 6. 
79. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 359 (1984); BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3-30 (1980) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, JUSTICE]. For a view that recognizes the importance of publicly-accessi- 
ble premises of argumentation, yet affords more respect to religious positions, see 
GREENAWALT, supra note 57, at 49-84; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and 
Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019 (1990); Kent 
Greenawalt, Religiously Based Premises and Laws Restrictive of Liberty, 1986 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 245. 
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discourse needs to be "neutral" and "rational," and accordingly, 
religious speech should stay out of the public square. Many 
modern liberals contend that since religious experience is not 
verifiable through objective means, it has no place in the 
objectivist realm of public life.80 The result of this approach is 
the systematic privileging of secularism over religious tradi- 
tionalism in politics. Religion is thereby marginalized and ren- 
dered impotent to affect on its own terms the public policy of 
the nation. This does not imply that religious viewpoints can- 
not sneak into the public debate disguised in secular garb. 
They can and often do. But in leaving behind the language of 
faith and tradition t o  don secularist attire, the true nature, 
appeal and strength of religious conceptions are necessarily 
obscured. This robs religious convictions of their persuasive 
force, enfeebling them in the struggle against the secularist 
hegemony in the public square. With traditional and religious 
institutions unable t o  defend their validity adequately under 
the secularist terms of the debate, secular government has 
progressively narrowed the range of permitted religious contri- 
butions to public life by shifting the line between public and 
private spheres so as t o  enlarge the former at  the expense of 
the latter. The result in America has been that the "wall of 
separation between church and state" has sometimes become a 
wall of exclusion that continuously pushes religion into social 
and political irrelevance. Thus, armed with the rhetoric of 
neutrality, those who are not inclined toward religious tradi- 
tionalism have excluded from the public square many of the 
cultural voices with which they di~agree.~' 
The postmodernist critique of the metaphysical foundations 
of liberalism and the failure of what Alasdair MacIntyre has 
called "the Enlightenment project"82 of working out the meta- 
physical and epistemological foundations of moral and political 
life have undermined the plausibility of the idea of a neutral, 
80. ACKERMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 79, at 3-30. Even liberals like Kent 
Greenawalt who are sympathetic to religious sensibilities would only allow religious 
convictions into the public arena under narrow conditions. See, e g . ,  GREENAWALT, 
supm note 57, at 215-43. 
81. Peter Berger suggests that what we may be witnessing in this process is 
the manipulation of constitutional symbols to achieve the cultural dominance of the 
highly secularized "knowledge class." Peter Berger, From the Crisis of Religion to 
the Crisis of Secularity, in RELIGION AND AMERICA: S P I R I T U A ~  IN A SECULAR AGE 
14, 19 wary Douglas & Steven Tipton eds., 1983). 
82. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AITER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 36-78 (2d 
ed. 1984). 
444 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
secular discourse that can provide a universally shared founda- 
tion upon which social and political institutions can be buikS3 
Post-modern analysis exposes theoretical neutrality and objec- 
tivity as myths. In the absence of any absolute standard of 
neutrality, the secular order can claim no privileged position in 
the process of community building. Both the secular and the 
religious worldviews are equally non-neutral. Classic liberal- 
ism, then, is merely one way of relating to the world. Religious 
traditionalism emerges as another that can make equal claims 
to participate in political discourse. In a parallel vein, post- 
modern critique suggests that the publicfprivate distinction 
lacks objective grounding. Thus the placement of the line be- 
tween public and private, a divide which dramatically affects 
the place of religion in America, is not a neutral boundary 
reflecting objective social realities. Secularist pretensions have 
had a pervasive impact on Supreme Court adjudication in the 
religion clause area, resulting in what Professor Gedicks has 
called "[tlhe privileging of secular knowledge in public life as 
objective and the marginalizing of religious belief in private life 
as s~bjective."'~ 
Even more important, the critique of modernist metaphys- 
ics discredits the view that belief and fact can be adequately 
distinguished in the molding of public policy. Thus the percep- 
tion that the state can coherently exclude the religious voice 
from public discourse is a mirage. S o  the postmodern critique 
alters the fundamental questions in the debate over religion 
and politics. Instead of asking (incoherently) how or whether 
there should be a role for religion in public life, the question 
becomes how ought we to relate with people in the public arena 
who are religious? Or, how are we, religious and nonreligious 
citizens alike, to be together? What are our ethical and political 
obligations to each other, given who we are in this time and 
place? 
Unfortunately, such questions are asked all too infrequent- 
ly. Instead, relying on a defunct metaphysics, our media, aca- 
demic, political and legal elites overtly privilege the secular 
world view, while subtly (or not so subtly) disparaging tradi- 
tional religious perspectives. The most obvious example is the 
83. See generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 57-76 
(1988). 
84. Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA.  L. REV. 
671, 681 (1992). 
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Supreme Court's rejection of a Louisiana statute requiring 
public school teachers to teach creation science whenever evolu- 
tion was taught.85 The Court chose simply to ignore the secu- 
lar purposes advanced by the state in defense of the law, treat- 
ing them as a ruse concocted by religious fundamentalists to 
advance their beliefs. Whatever the ultimate merits of the cre- 
ation science debate may turn out to be, its advocates at least 
deserved credit for gathering empirical data that raise ques- 
tions about evolutionary dogmas, and their views deserved 
more respect than they were given when they were summarily 
rejected by the Court. Whatever else one may think of the 
controversy, the Court's decision can scarcely be said to be 
neutral as between world views. In a finite world, no school 
system can be expected to teach all possible world views, and 
in a pluralistic world, state endorsement of sectarian doctrine 
is inappropriate. It does not follow that secularist outlooks 
deserve absolute hegemony. 
The creation science case is merely one of many contexts in 
which secular interests receive favored treatment. We recognize 
that in many situations what is involved is a legitimate effort 
on the part of the state to  avoid problems that inevitably arise 
when affirmative pecuniary aid to religious or quasi-religious 
institutions is involved-most notably the additional complexi- 
ties for assuring equal treatment and for avoiding coerced sup- 
port of particular religious orientations by non-adherents. We 
are not calling here for the unravelling of the Supreme Court's 
decisions proscribing such though we recognize that at  
least some of the twists and turns of this jurisprudence seem 
unnecessarily hostile to religion. In any event, greater sensitivi- 
ty to religious concerns could be displayed. 
This systematic privileging of secular convictions in our 
courts and, more generally, in the public square causes reli- 
gious individuals and groups to feel marginalized and excluded. 
Aware that secularist perspectives can impinge upon their 
ways of life, and that there is no neutral reason why such 
85. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
86. See, eg., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. 
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Com- 
mittee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lem- 
on v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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views should always prevail in public policy a t  the expense of 
more religious worldviews, religious people are beginning to 
resist the power of secularism in the political arena. The pro- 
found cultural realignment along orthodox and progressive (or 
traditionalist and secularist) lines discussed above8" is a re- 
sult, in part, of the state favoring almost exclusively one side of 
the tension between secular and more traditional conceptions of 
life. As religious groups become increasingly suspicious of the 
rhetoric of secular neutrality, such favoritism only serves to 
heighten the traditionalist/secularist tension. 
Recent developments in the United States Supreme Court's 
treatment of religious liberty issues and their impact on reli- 
gious intermediary associations must be examined against the 
background of the overlapping individuallcommunity and tradi- 
tionalist/secularist dialectics that we have described thus far. 
The focus in this section will be on two of the Court's leading 
Religion Clause cases of the 1990s--one dealing with "free 
exercise" of religion and the other dealing with the prohibition 
of laws "respecting an establishment of religion.7788 The free 
exercise case, Employment Division v. Smith,89 was particular- 
ly harmful, since it effectively gutted the religious freedom 
protections afforded individuals in the United States. At a time 
when the United States has assumed special prominence in 
international affairs, the case is detrimental not only at  home, 
but in the signal it sends abroad. I t  represents a fundamentally 
misguided conception of religious liberty that recurs all too 
frequently in practice both within the United States and even 
more frequently elsewhere. As this Article goes to press, it is 
anticipated that the Smith debacle will be corrected within a 
few weeks by passage of the federal Religious Freedom Resto- 
ration Act ('aFRA").90 For good or ill, this means that future 
87. See supra notes 44-55 A d  accompanying text. 
88. The First Amendment Religion Clause provides, in its entirety, "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the h e  
exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
89. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
90. For analysis of this Act and its signifcame, see Douglas Laywck, The Reli- 
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, and Rex E. Lee, .The Reli- 
gious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. 
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free exercise claims will be decided by applying statutory rath- 
er than constitutional law in the United States. While it is 
hoped that RFRA as a functional matter will restore the 
protections previously afforded to religious liberty by the First 
Amendment, there is some risk that prevailing on a statutory 
RFRA claim will not have the same symbolic significance that 
vindication of a constitutional claim has long carried in Ameri- 
can culture. Moreover, as with any statute, there is a practical 
risk that particular protections may be eroded by subsequent 
legislative enactments. 
The Non-Establishment Clause case, Lee v. Weisman:' is 
less dramatic, but reflects uncertainties about how state and . 
religious activity should be allowed to interact in an open soci- 
ety. 
A. Free Exercise Betrayed: Employment Division v. Smith 
The Religion Clause of the First Amendment is not merely 
a terse formulation of normative expectations in the United 
States with respect to religious liberty. It embodies one of the 
deepest principles of liberty for all human beings. Indeed, reli- 
gious liberty is not only a "first freedom," but also the oldest of 
the internationally recognized human rights. I t  was afforded 
international protection a t  least as early as 1648 in the Peace 
of We~tphalia.'~ Yet it is a right that is constantly a t  risk in 
every society because of intense countervailing social and politi- 
cal pressures and because of the inconvenience to government 
officials of accommodating religious differences. In part because 
of the ongoing historical experience with these pressures, the 
right to religious freedom has undergone substantial develop- 
ment spanning centuries. The central tragedy of the Smith 
decision is its betrayal not only of what "free exercise" original- 
ly meant to the American  framer^,'^ but of all that it has 
come to mean, both in the United States and elsewhere, in the 
two centuries that have followed. 
In order to perceive the magnitude of the betrayal, i t  is 
necessary to analyze the Smith case against the longer evolu- 
L. REV. 73. 
91. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
92. Treaty of Westphalia, October 24, 1648, in 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF 
MODERN HISTORY: 1648-1967, at 7 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967). 
93. See, e.g., Michael W. McCo~e l l ,  The Origins and Historical Understanding 
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). 
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tion of the right to religious freedom. In Smith, two Native 
Americans, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were fired by a 
private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested 
peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes at a 
ceremony of their Native American Chur~h.'~ When they ap- 
plied for unemployment benefits their applications were denied 
by the State of Oregon under a state law disqualifying employ- 
ees "discharged for work-related 'misconduct.' "95 The case ar- 
rived a t  the Supreme Court on appeal from an Oregon Su- 
preme Court decision holding that the sacramental use of peyo- 
te was protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment and that, therefore, Black and Smith were entitled 
to payment of unemployment benefitsg6 
In a surprising decision that abandoned decades of prece- 
dent, the Smith Court held that there is no free exercise ex- 
emption from generally applicable laws that unintentionally 
penalize religious worship.97 Put another way, generally appli- 
cable neutral laws were held to override religious liberty. The 
Court jettisoned the doctrine, applied at least since 1972:~ 
that permits burdens on religious liberty only if supported by a 
compelling state interest that could be achieved in no less re- 
strictive way." 
Part of the tragedy of the Smith decision was that it was 
so unnecessary. The issue of the continued vitality of the com- 
pelling state interest test had not been briefed (because all 
parties had assumed it was the applicable test). There was no 
pressing reason that this issue had to be reached. Moreover, 
94. 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). There have never been any worries about either 
the bona fides of the Native American Church or about whether the "cloak of reli- 
gion" was being invoked to shield use of a recreational drug. The Native American 
Church is ancient and clearly uses peyote for sacramental purposes. Douglas 
Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7. Peyote buds are 
%ugh, bitter, difficult to chew, and frequently cause nausea or vomiting" and are 
thus an unlikely subject of recreational use. Id. (citing EDWARD F. ANDERSON, PEY- 
OTE: TIEE DIVINE CACTUS 161 (1980) & J m S  S. SLOTKIN, THE PEYOTE WAY 98 
(1956)). 
95. 494 U.S. at 874. 
96.- Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Or. 1986). 
97. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. "Ftespondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that 
when otherwise prohibitable 'conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not 
only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regula- 
tion. We have never held that, and decline to do so now." Id. at 882. See also 
Gedicks, supm note 84, at 687-93 (criticizing the Smith decision). 
98. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
99. Id at 214-15. 
42 11 RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 449 
the Court could have concluded, as Justice O'Connor did in her 
concurrence, that Oregon's interests in enforcing its drug laws 
were sufficiently compelling to override the religious liberty 
claims asserted in the case. By taking this approach, the Court 
could have reached the same functional result without disman- 
tling its traditional free exercise jurisprudence. But the majori- 
ty eschewed this less drastic approach. 
The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Scalia, was 
no doubt motivated a t  least in part by Scalia's more general 
tendency to believe that courts should be maximally deferential 
to legislative enactments.loO Beyond that, the Court justified 
its decision first on the grounds that granting exemptions to 
generally applicable laws on account of religious convictions 
was flirting with social chaos. 
Any society adopting such a system would be courting anar- 
chy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the 
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to 
coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because "we are a 
cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every con- 
ceivable religious preference," and precisely because we value 
and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the 
luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as  applied to the 
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not 
protect an interest of the highest order.I0' 
In one of the few bright spots in the decision, the Court also 
reasoned that involving judges in the determination of whether 
a religious practice was central to an individual's religion and 
therefore deserving of a religious exemption from a general law 
would enmesh courts in an impermissible inquiry into the cen- 
trality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.lo2 Finally, 
the Court sought to distinguish past cases granting free exer- 
cise exemptions to certain generally applicable laws by suggest- 
ing that all such cases involved '%ybrid claims" in which a free 
exercise claim was conjoined with some other constitutional 
100. See Stephen Wizner, Jzuiging in the Good Society: A Comment on the Juris- 
prudence of Justice Scdia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1840-41 (1991); see also 
George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 
(1990) (analyzing the philosophical and methodological hallmarks of Justice Scalia's 
jurisprudence). 
101. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 
(1961)). 
102. Id. at 886-87. 
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protection (such as free speech) in order to give the free exer- 
cise claim sufficient strength to  prevail.lo3 
The Smith decision is problematic for a variety of reasons 
that have been catalogued a t  length in the literature and need 
not be recapitulated here.lo4 The major problem is that any 
neutral, generally applicable law, however insignificant and ill- 
conceived, can trump religious liberty. This places smaller 
religious groups that lack significant political influence at con- 
stant risk of having their religious freedom rights violated by 
an intolerant or inadvertently insensitive majority. Moreover, 
individuals or groups whose religious liberty is burdened by a 
law, administrative regulation, o r  other state action no longer 
have any leverage (in the form of a threatened law suit) to 
induce government bureaucrats to accommodate religious prac- 
tices. In general, in the modern bureaucratic state, where gov- 
ernment regulation increasingly pervades all social space, there 
is the danger that meaningful religious liberty will be buried, 
whether deliberately or not, under a mass of administrative 
rules and guidelines and often sacrificed to  lower order bureau- 
cratic values such as administrative efficiency. 
Another profoundly disturbing result of Smith is the rele- 
gation of religious liberty to second class status in the hierar- 
chy of rights. No longer able to stand on its own feet, the right 
to free exercise of religion is conceived under Smith as a hob- 
bled right that must be bolstered with rights of expression or 
association (or penumbral family rights that Scalia would at- 
tack in other contexts) in order t o  successfully challenge a 
general law.lo5 
103. Id. at 876-82. 
104. The approach followed by the Court does not comport with the Free Exer- 
cise Clause as probably understood by the constitutional framers. See generally 
McConnell, supra note 93; Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have 
Killed Him!? Freedom of Religion in the Post-modem Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
163, 166-72. For general criticisms of Smith, see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants 
of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McCo~el l ,  Free Ewcise Reui- 
sionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). Even the 
staunchest supporters of the decision recognize that it was poorly reasoned. Wil- 
liam P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.  CHI. L. 
REV. 308, 308-09 (1991). 
105. To date, other courts have not been able or inclined to derive much mileage 
from hybrid rights claims. See Shawn G u ~ a r s o n ,  Note, No Constitutional Shelter: 
The Ninth Circuit's Reading of the Hybrid Claims Doctrine in American Friends 
Service Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh, 1993 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 413. In the context 
of the Smith decision, the "hybrid rights" theory appears to be not so much a 
genuine doctrine as a highly artificial construct employed to avoid the need to ex- 
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Problems such as the foregoing constitute the primary 
betrayal in Smith-the undercutting of rights previously pro- 
tected. Justice Scalia responds t o  this type of criticism in part 
by claiming that there have in fact been relatively few Supreme 
Court cases that have sustained free exercise claims. This ar- 
gument fails to  take into account the number of free exercise 
claims that have been vindicated in lower courts and, even 
more significantly, the incalculable number of instances in 
which lower level officials have been deterred from encroaching 
on religious liberty so long as the compelling state interest test 
could be invoked. Viewed in this light, the magnitude of the 
"primary" betrayal is immense. 
Beyond this, there is a second-level sense in which the 
decision betrays decades and indeed generations of progress in 
the field of religious liberty. A full account of this development 
is beyond the scope of this Article; a brief overview will need to 
suffice. 
The starting point for our purposes is the history of reli- 
gious liberty in the period following the Reformation. The ap- 
plicable principle then was summed up in the phrase cuius 
regio, eius religio, which was enunciated in connection with the 
Peace of Augsburg in 1555.1°6 Under this principle, the secu- 
lar prince was given the right to  dictate the religion of his 
realm to assure a religiously homogeneous population. Dissent- 
ers could move to  a friendlier domain or possibly practice the 
"freedom of the hearth" (i.e., the freedom to believe what they 
would a t  home so long as the belief was not manifested outside 
the confines of the home). Beyond this, they had little other 
recourse. In short, the secular ruler or the state under this 
regime had virtually unlimited discretion in imposing limita- 
tions on religious liberty and was free to impose burdens or 
outright prohibitions on non-preferred religions. 
pressly overrule Wisconsin u. Yoder. Justice Scalia may have been driven to this by 
worries that he might lose the vote of one or more of his colleagues in support if 
his opinion for the Court in Smith could not be squared with Yoder. Construed 
with sufficient breadth, the hybrid rights doctrine could undo much of the damage 
inflicted by the Smith decision. Because religious liberty claims almost always 
overlap with other constitutional claims-freedom of speech, press, assembly, equal 
protection, etc.-hybrid claims can be asserted in most contexts in which "puren 
religious liberty claims are available. It is stiil too early to tell whether this ave- 
nue holds much promise. The expected passage of the Religious Freedom Restora- 
tion Act may obviate the need for the Court to address this issue. 
106. 1 HAJO HOLBORN, A HIS~ORY OF MODERN GERMANY: THE REFORMATION 243 
(1976). 
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As compared with such absolute discretion, the require- 
ment that emerged by the late 18th century that only generally 
applicable limitations could be imposed marked a considerable 
advance. The basic notion was that religious liberty would be 
recognized within the limits established by law, with the un- 
derstanding that only neutral laws of general applicability 
would count as appropriate limiting laws. In a famous formula- 
tion that is still recognized in German constitutional law, "Ev- 
ery religious body shall regulate and administer its affairs 
independently within the limits of the law valid for all."107 
The state was still free to impose any limitations on churches 
that it liked, but under this rule of law constraint, it could only 
do so if it was willing to impose the limitation generally on all 
religious groups, including those that were dominant or other- 
wise favored. Early versions of religious liberty, such as those 
enunciated toward the end of the 18th century, tended to as- 
sume that this rule of law constraint on religious liberty limita- 
tions would be adequate to safeguard religious liberty concerns. 
The rule of law constraint is still evident in Article 9 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental  freedom^,'^^ with its insistence that ''Freedom 
to manifest one's religion o r  beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law."'09 The European Court 
of Human Rights has held that this phrase "does not merely 
refer back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of law, 
requiring it to  be compatible with the rule of law, which is 
expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Con~ention.""~ 
Arguably, any law that specifically targets or imposes special 
burdens on a particular religious group, or that is retroactive or 
unduly vague, would run afoul of this requirement.'" 
Essentially, what Smith holds is that religious liberty 
under the First Amendment is to be equated with this rule of 
law constraint. Thus, Smith is a throwback to the days of en- 
lightened despotism. There can be no doubt that effective impo- 
107. GRUNDGE~ER [Constitution] [GG] art. 140 (F.R.G.) (incorporating art. 137(3) 
of the Weimar Constitution) (emphasis added). The italicized phrase dates back to 
the 18th century. 
108. European Convention, supra note 11, art. 9, para. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
109. Id. (emphasis added). 
110. Malone Case, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 32 (1984). 
111. For a now classic summary of the various ways legislation may run afoul of 
rule of law constraints, see LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-41 (rev. ed. 
19f39). 
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sition of t . s  constraint marked significant progress historically 
and that it can continue to provide significant safeguards to- 
day. But the years since the end of the 18th century have 
taught that additional constraints on the permissible limita- 
tions of religious liberty are vital if a vibrant system of reli- 
gious freedom is to emerge. 
Since the end of the 18th century, as societies began to 
have more experience with genuine regimes of religious liberty, 
sensitivity grew concerning recurrent problem areas. The re- 
quirement found in Article 9 which permits only those limita- 
tions necessary for "interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others"l12 summarizes these problem 
areas. A variety of significant cases fall into these categories. 
Without evaluating the merits of such cases, several situations 
come to mind: the legality of requiring immunizations,l13 the 
permissibility of objecting to blood tran~fusions,''~ the 19th 
century Mormon polygamy cases,'15 contemporary problems 
with "drug" churches,l16 human117 or animal sacrifice 
cases,l18 to name a few. Differing societies may draw differing 
conclusions about exactly where the borderline of religious 
liberty should be drawn, but we are aware of no society that 
fails to recognize the need for some limitation on religious 
liberty in a t  least some of the foregoing areas. 
At the same time, i t  did not take long to realize that the 
list of permissible grounds for encroachment on religious liber- 
ty summarized in Article 9 was so broad that it could justify 
almost as much intervention in religious liberty as the cuius 
regio principle. And while the rule of law constraint provided 
some assurance that governmental power would not be abused, 
112. European Convention, supra note 11, art. 9. 
113. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US. 11 (1905). 
114. See, e.g., In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 
F.2d 1000 @.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). 
115. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145 (1878); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 US. 14 (1946) (Mormon split- 
off group). 
116. See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 19681, cert. de- 
nied 386 U.S. 917 (1967); North Carolina v. Bullard, 148 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1966); 
cf. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (peyote use in longestablished Na- 
tive American Church). 
117. Stephen L. Pepper, m e  Case of the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 897 
(198 1). 
118. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
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history has demonstrated that this constraint is not enough to 
assure meaningful religious liberty. Many of the major religious 
persecutions of the last two centuries have been carried out 
under the guise of laws that are at least formally general and 
neutral. All that is necessary to encroach on religious liberty 
while remaining faithful to the rule of law constraint is to pass 
laws that prohibit everyone in the population from engaging in 
conduct that is of concern only to  a particular religious group. 
Note that this often happens not because of intentional animus 
against a particular group, but because those passing the law 
are unaware of its adverse impact on a lesser-known religious 
group- 
Because of this deficiency in the rule of law constraint, 
most advanced systems have further restricted the state's abili- 
ty to limit religious liberty. As phrased in Article 9, this is the 
requirement that freedom to manifest religion shall be subject 
only "to such limitations as . . . are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, [et~.]""~ The 
Strasbourg Court has construed this to mean that the interfer- 
ence with a right must be motivated by a "pressing social need" 
and must be "proportionate t o  the legitimate aim pursued."'20 
While contracting states enjoy a certain "margin of apprecia- 
tion" in determining how this applies in their own national 
setting,121 interference with a right as fundamental as free- 
dom of religion should be no greater than necessary and should 
utilize the least intrusive means possible. This corresponds to 
the compelling state interest test under United States law prior 
to Smith which, at  least in theory, was designed to protect 
religious communities from the state, thus helping to ensure 
the viability of such communities. For instance, in direct con- 
trast t o  the United States Supreme Court's refusal in ReynoZds 
v. United States t o  exempt Mormons from bigamy laws on the 
basis of religious belief,122 the Court in  Wisconsin v. 
Y ~ d e r ' ~ ~  granted the Old Order Amish a constitutional ex- 
emption from certain compulsory schooling laws. Even though 
the Court found that the state had a high interest in providing 
for the education of children, it nevertheless held that the Free 
119. European Convention, supra note 11, art. 9. 
120. Case of Silver and Others, 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1983). 
121. Id. at 37. 
122. 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). 
123. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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Exercise Clause protected the Amish people's desire to preserve 
the integrity of their traditional religious ~u1 tu re . l~~  
If religious liberty is t o  have genuine practical meaning, 
this type of heightened requirement for any legislation (or 
other state action) that encroaches on religious liberty is vital. 
Failure to insist on this type of constitutional requirement 
implies that the majority, subject to the rule of law constraint, 
can override the religious liberty claims of minorities virtually 
a t  will. It is simply too late in world history to be content with 
religious liberty protections that allow that kind of infraction. 
The approach pursued by the Smith Court fails to grasp what 
is most central to the tradition of religious liberty and funda- 
mentally betrays the content, the historic progress, and accept- 
ed international standards with respect to one of the supreme 
values of human life. 
B. The Exclusionary Wall of Separation: Lee v. Weisman 
Lee v. W e i ~ m a n ' ~ ~  was a much anticipated decision that 
some scholars thought might alter the Supreme Court's ap- 
proach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While Weisman 
was under consideration, Professor Mary Ann Glendon and 
Raul F. Yanes that "[slix of the present Justices [were] on re- 
cord as dissatisfied with the Court's attempt in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman to place mortar in the crumbling wall of separation 
[between church and state]."126 Glendon and Yanes hoped 
that the Court would use this opportunity to depart from its 
"excessively separationist" interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause and move toward a more holistic approach to religious 
liberty.12' On these grounds, however, Weisman turned out to 
be a disappointment. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman creat- 
ed a tripartite test to  determine if a state interaction with 
religion violates the Establishment Clause. To satisfy the Es- 
tablishment Clause, Lemon requires that a government prac- 
tice must (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a prima- 
ry effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) 
avoid excessive government entanglement with re1igi0n.l~~ In 
124. Id. at 234-36. 
125. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
126. Glendon & Yanes, supra, note 67, at 547-58; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing the current test for Establishment Clause questions). 
127. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 67, at 547-48. 
128. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib- 
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Lemon itself the Court held that the two statutory schemes 
before the Court violated the entanglement prong of its newly 
articulated test. As a result, the state could not reimburse 
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools for the cost of 
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in 
certain secular subjects. Nor could it directly pay teachers of 
secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools with a supple- 
ment of fifteen percent of their annual income. Chief Justice 
Burger wrote that because public funds would have to be moni- 
tored to ensure that they were in fact being used solely for 
secular purposes, both programs would result in an impermissi- 
ble entanglement of secular government with religion and 
therefore were unconstitutional under the Establishment 
C 1 a ~ s e . l ~ ~  
While the application of the Lemon test yields results that 
reflect sound principles of church-state separation in many 
cases, wooden application of the test has too often resulted in 
insensitive refusal to make appropriate adjustments and ac- 
commodations of religion and its role in American life.13" 
Thus, Lemon has been invoked to strike down a federal pro- 
gram that for years had benefited educationally deprived stu- 
dents from low income families because it entailed sending 
publicly employed teachers into parochial  school^.'^' I t  has 
led to arcane discussions over how much secularity is necessary 
to sanitize the religiosity of Christmas displays on public 
lands.132 Increasingly, decisions which have pushed the Lem- 
on test to secularist extremes have resulted in subtle and not 
so subtle privileging of secularist outlooks and the 
marginalization of religion in society. All too often, the Su- 
preme Court and lower courts have weighed in on the secular- 
ist side of the innate tension between religious traditionalism 
and secularism. 
Many concerned with the excessively secularist tilt result- 
ing from rigid application of the Lemon test had hoped that the 
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U S .  756,' 773 (1973). 
129. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619, 621-22, 625; see also Glendon & Panes, supra note 
67, at 502-03 (briefly discussing Lemon). 
130. See genemuy Michael W. McCo~ell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. 
Cr. REV. 1. 
131. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); see School Dist. of the City of 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U S .  373 (1985). 
132. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 US. 573 (1989); Lynch v. 
Do~e l ly ,  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman would be more sensitive t o  
the need for a religious voice in our culture.133 But in the 
end, the Court proved reluctant to depart from the encrusted 
precedent of Lemon. 
Weisman involved a school girl and her father's challenge 
to the constitutionality of graduation prayer in public 
schools.134 Deborah Weisman and her father sought, under 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, to perma- 
nently enjoin the public middle and high schools in Providence, 
Rhode Island from inviting members of the local clergy t o  give 
invocations and benedictions a t  those schools' graduation cere- 
monies.135 It was the custom of the Providence School District 
to give the invited local clergy a pamphlet before graduation 
entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions," which was prepared 
by the National Conference of Christians and Jews.136 "The 
Guidelines recommend[edl that public prayers at nonsectarian 
civic ceremonies be composed with 'inclusiveness and 
sensitivity' . . . ."I3' The school principal provided Rabbi 
Gutterman with the pamphlet prior to the graduation and 
advised him that the prayers should be nonse~tarian.'~~ 
133. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at  8, 12-13, 15-16, Lee v. 
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014). 
134. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
135. Id. at  2652-53. In their efforts, the Weismans, both Jewish, opposed the 
nonsectarian prayers of a Jewish Rabbi, Leslie Gutterman. The prayers were re- 
markable not for their eloquent affirmation of faith, but for their conspicuous secu- 
larity, even sterility. The invocation went as follows: 
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: 
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights 
of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and 
women grow up to enrich it. 
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates 
grow up to guard it. 
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may par- 
ticipate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. 
May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. 
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of 
Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it. 
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who 
are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. 
AMEN 
Id. at 2652-53. Significant social division or sectarian strife is unlikely to be pro- 
voked by such pronouncements. 
136. Id. at 2652. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
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The Court framed the issue in Weisman as "whether in- 
cluding clerical members who offer prayers as part of the offi- 
cial school graduation ceremony is consistent with the Religion 
Clauses of the First A~nendment,"~~~ With a narrow five-Jus- 
tice majority, the Court held that nonsectarian prayer at high 
school graduations (in circumstances where "young graduates 
who object are induced to conform") is unconstit~tional.~~~ 
While this outcome was disappointing t o  those who had hoped 
for a rethinking of the Lemon test and for a more 
accommodationist approach, it is difficult t o  know what to 
make of this case. After all, at least five Justices, including 
Justice Kennedy, who authored the Weisman opinion, had 
repeatedly suggested that the Lemon test was ripe for reconsid- 
eration.l4' Nonetheless, Justice K e ~ e d y  wrote an opinion 
that both explicitly declined to reconsider Lemon and, for the 
most part, ignored it. The opinion instead focuses on coercion, 
asking whether the government had coerced "anyone to support 
or participate in religion or its exercise."142 What exactly this 
portends for Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains un- 
~ 1 e a r . l ~ ~  
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 2661. 
141. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2150 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (listing instances when members of the Court 
have suggested revisiting the Lemon test). 
142. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. 
143. At first blush, Weisman appeared to preclude any form of graduation prayer 
in public high schools. The Fifth Circuit, however, has subsequently sustained a 
school district resolution permitting prayer at high school graduation exercises 
where discretion whether to include prayer is left to the choice of the graduating 
class and the prayer itself is given by a student volunteer. Jones v. Clear Creek 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 
(1993). In a closely reasoned opinion, the court held that Weismun was distinguish- 
able. The Court concluded that nothing in Weisman undercut a finding that allow- 
ing prayer furthers a secular purpose of solemnizing graduation proceedings. Id. at 
966. Further, while the reasoning in Weisman eroded some of the grounds for 
thinking that graduation prayer had a primary effect of advancing religion, the 
court concluded that on balance the primary effect of the school district resolution 
at  issue remained secular. Id. a t  967. Particularly since students rather than clergy 
would offer prayers permitted in Jones, the court saw no basis for a finding of ex- 
cessive entanglement. Id. at  967-68. Further, assuming that the resolution would 
be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, and recognizing that the resolu- 
tion did not make prayers mandatory, the court found no endorsement of religion. 
Id. a t  968-69. Finally, the court distinguished the coercive impact of prayers per- 
mitted by the resolution, because they were not directed by school officials, they 
were both non-sectarian and voluntary, and they reflected the will of peers, "who 
are less able to coerce participation than an authority figure from the state or 
clergy." Id. at 969-71. Similarly, in Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. 
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It remains quite clear, however, that the impact of the 
Court's decisions is to foster an atmosphere that is pervasively 
secular and subtly hostile toward traditional, religious out- 
looks. Moreover, a majority of the Court still presses the notion 
of a neutrally-situated "wall of separation between church and 
state" long after such rhetoric has become philosophically inco- 
herer~t . '~~  The publiclprivate distinction implicit in the 
Court's delineation of the boundaries of state and church con- 
tinues to wall religious influence out of social sigdkance. The 
Court's position in this area is troubling. Its statement that 
"[tlhe design of the Constitution is that preservation and trans- 
mission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and 
a choice committed to the private sphere"145 goes to the heart 
of the Court's troubles. Such an assertion might make sense in 
two situations: first, where we could neutrally divine with some 
degree of accuracy the "natural" line that separates "public" 
from the "private"; or second, where government's activities are 
so limited that excluding its involvement with religion is, even 
if not neutral, irrelevant. (For example, if all government did 
were to set traffic rules, the exclusion of all religious influence 
from these decisions would not be very controversial; few would 
even care to object.) But neither of these two situations exists. 
Justice Kennedy and his colleagues on the Court cannot define 
a private o r  public sphere with any degree of ideological coher- 
ence; and we are far from the minimal state where churchhtate 
questions would be largely irrelevant. The result is a perverse 
paradox: in its very effort to guard against "divisive sectarian- 
ism" in the public square, and to achieve maximal "neutrality," 
Supp. 638 @. Idaho 19931, the court granted a motion for summary judgment in 
favor of a policy which allowed students to vote on whether graduation prayer 
could be held. The policy also allowed students to decide whether a student or 
minister should offer the prayer, or whether a moment of silence should be provid- 
ed. If the reasoning of the Jones and Harris court survives, the impact of Weisman 
will be substantially reduced. 
It is too early to tell whether the holding in Weisman will be extended beyond 
the sensitive setting of secondary schools. Prayers before legislative bodies have 
been sustained in the past. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Traditional 
prayers in other settings, such as city council meetings or judicial proceedings that 
involve primarily mature individuals and where non-participation is less stigmatiz- 
ing, may withstand constitutional scrutiny. But see North Carolina Civil Liberties 
Union Legal Found. v. Constancy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 
S. Ct. 3027 (1992) (judge's practice of b e g i ~ i n g  court sessions with prayer violated 
establishment clause). 
144. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
145. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at  2656. 
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the Court reinforces and intensifies the most fundamental 
polarization of our time-that between traditionalist and secu- 
larist orientations. In its concern to  preserve appropriate sepa- 
ration, the Court strives to separate religion from all facets of 
the ever-expanding agenda of the state with the result that 
religion is more and more marginalized and society is increas- 
ingly bereft of anything transcending the secular. 
IV. THE HAZARDS OF CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS 
A. The Hazard of Wooden Separationism, and the 
Need for Accommodation 
Properly conceived, separation of church and state is an 
important part of American culture, but when invoked without 
sensitivity to  the values and institutions it is designed to safe- 
guard, it can be a hazardous slogan. For decades the Soviets 
prided themselves on their particular version of separation of 
church and state, which basically called for the exclusion of 
religion from any domain in which the state was present.146 
The obvious practical implication of this policy was the 
marginalization of religion in social and political life. 
I t  is exceedingly unlikely that separationist pressures in 
the United States would ever permit a regime as openly hostile 
to religion as the aggressively secularist government of the 
former U.S.S.R. However, interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause of the United States Constitution in a manner that 
woodenly insists that religion be excluded from any state-per- 
vaded domain can have consequences that differ only in degree. 
With the rise of the welfare state, governmental institutions 
play roles that penetrate all aspects of contemporary life. Ap- 
plying an interpretation of the Establishment Clause in the 
modern setting that is conceptually designed for the minimalist 
night watchman state has an inevitable tendency to skew the 
social balance in favor of secularists and against traditionalists. 
In today's sprawling regulatory state, it is particularly vital 
that the idea of churchhtate separation be invoked in ways 
that are liberating rather than marginalizing. Separation needs 
to be understood in the sense of making space for the 
transformative influence of religion and allowing it to extend 
146. Albert Boiter, Law and Religion in the Soviet Union, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 
97, 115-24 (1987). 
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its fragde tendrils into new areas. Because state action in the 
complex modern setting can easily have adverse impacts on 
religious institutions, the state should be required to accommo- 
date religious institutions to the maximum extent feasible. As 
the state invades more and more of social space, exemptions 
and accommodation become ever more critical if religious insti- 
tutions are to survive the growing harshness of an increasingly 
secular en~ironment. '~~ Some of the most important social 
tasks are best carried out by religious organizations, and wood- 
en separationism may preclude that from occurring.148 
One particularly troubling version of the problem of wood- 
en separationism can be seen in the recurring contention that 
state programs which reflect or coincide with religious views 
violate the Establishment Clause. This contention has been 
particularly visible in litigation challenging abortion regula- 
tion,14' but it can easily surface in other contexts. If this type 
of contention were to prevail, it would effectively banish reli- 
gious values from public discourse, thus blatantly privileging 
secular over religious values. Such an approach turns the cen- 
tral values of the First Amendment on their head, muzzling 
religious speakers and holding that they, alone among the 
participants in political discourse, are proscribed from sharing 
the full richness of their opinions with others in the public 
square. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has consistently reject- 
ed this line of arg~ment. '~" 
B. The Hazard of Epistemological Privileging of the Secular 
The deeper and more general hazard in the modern law of 
religious liberty is what we have called the "epistemological 
privileging of the secular." Modern consciousness is so filled. 
with secularist assumptions that this hazard often goes unno- 
ticed. Secular discourse is so pervasive that the subtlety of its 
dominance is often overlooked. As a result, religious narratives 
147. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a 
Response to Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 692-93 (1992). 
148. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) 
(permitting funding of sign language interpreter for student attending religious 
educational institution); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (rejecting a facial 
challenge to a federal aid program that permitted funding of programs sponsored 
by religious organizations in light of the distinctive contribution they could make to 
combatting teenage pregnancy). 
149. Hams v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980). 
150. Id. at 319 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
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stand out as unusual; for many they have curious-even fright- 
ening-links to the transcendent and the numinous. Secular 
narratives are so tied to the ordinary that they blend into the 
unnoticed background of common sense. 
Our sense is that religious believers on the whole are bet- 
ter at understanding secular discourse than vice versa. Secular- 
ist accounts of reality, including secularist accounts of religious 
liberty, always seem to let something vital slip out. They are 
inevitably reductionist. They attempt to reduce the description 
of reality to a seemingly neutral, secular discourse but remain 
blind to the richness and diversity of religious discourse. The 
very canons of what counts as neutral and secular bracket out 
modes of discourse engendered by the transformative influence 
of religion. 
Part of what we need is a deconstruction of this neutralist 
discourse. In the crucible of the religious strife following the 
Reformation that helped forge our modern conceptions of reli- 
gious liberty, it made sense t o  think of secular categories as a 
neutral Archimedean vantage point from which compromise on 
issues of radical disagreement could be worked out. But in an 
age when the key polarization on a whole range of issues such 
as abortion, the family, homosexuality, education, media and 
the arts, and law is no longer denominational, but originates 
instead in the tension between religious believers and secular- 
ists, invoking secular discourse as a neutral ground seems 
hopelessly circular and naive. 
In the last analysis, religious liberty is about resolving 
cultural disagreements that go "all the way down." Religious 
liberty first emerged at a time when disagreements about reli- 
gious doctrine had this character. We have learned much about 
how to live with this kind of division, though certainly not 
enough. However, in our time, the much more critical divide 
runs between those who believe and those who do not, between 
practicing adherents of religious traditions and those who claim 
emancipation from those traditions. Religious liberty needs to 
be understood in ways that can make common life in a society 
characterized by such radical pluralism possible. 
What is frightening about the image of culture wars is its 
picture of society polarized into two opposing camps that radi- 
cally disagree. To paint a more pleasant picture of society, we 
need concepts, theories and practices which, while showing 
genuine respect to all sides, will help expand the basis for a 
community of understanding between the two sides of contem- 
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porary culture wars, and prevent that vital domain from being 
attenuated into nothingness. 
Unfortunately, the polarization suggested by the notion of 
culture wars is an all too accurate characterization of the fun- 
damental tensions in modern society. The question is whether 
the unravelling threads of our social fabric can somehow be 
held together. Preserving that tapestry may depend o n  the 
willingness of individuals to acknowledge the extent to which 
all of us exist in, and struggle with, the tensions between tradi- 
tionalist and secular perspectives. In a sense, then, the cultural 
polarization we have discussed creates a profoundly unnatural 
human and social condition. The debate is framed in stark 
alternatives of the "secular" and the "religious." These positions 
drive individuals, who are by their natures neither wholly 
secular nor entirely traditionalist, into one of two opposing 
camps. But life is not a simple choice between the traditional 
and the secular. Our pathways always weave in and out of both 
modes of experience-and the precise character of our experi- 
ence as we tread any particular stretch of road hinges critically 
on the 'little platoon[~]"'~~ (to borrow Burke's p h r a s e h n  the 
intermediate groups-with which we walk. The ultimate im- 
poverishment of either/or reasoning in this domain is its failure 
to recognize that the actual texture of life offers a "bothhnd." 
Our multifarious social contexts can place us daily in both 
highly secular and highly religious environments, requiring 
that we be on both sides of the secularist/traditionalist divide 
within a short span of time. What is vital for the protection of 
the full richness of life is a political consensus that yields indi- 
viduals the largest social space practicable wherein they may 
move freely between these competing yet intertwined modes of 
experience. In our highly secularized society, this dictates that 
we grant space and relevance to religious mediating struc- 
tures-to our churches, dioceses, synagogues, mosques and 
congregations. Walls of separation and cramped interpretations 
of religious freedom such as that in Smith simply will not do. 
What is vital for experiencing the full meaning of our indi- 
vidual and communal paths is dialogue-dialogue with our- 
151. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FF~ANcE 135 (Conor 
C. O'Brien ed., Penguin Books 1969) (1790). 
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selves, dialogue within our own sub-communities, and broader 
dialogue at the level of society. As each person must reconcile 
within himself the traditional and the secular without self- 
destructing, so too must society. We believe that lawyers can 
play a particularly significant role in this process. They are one 
of the few groups that has the patience to engage in reasoning 
that is longer than the length of headlines or sound-bites. 
There is of course considerable risk that the high degree of 
secularization of the profession undermines its capacity t o  play 
a mediating role. But whatever the role of lawyers may turn 
out to be in this larger social process, it is vital to find ways to 
fight forces that cripple dialogue coming from both sides of the 
cultural divide. We need to resist the temptation to oversimpli- 
fy. We are all guilty of using oppressive discoursmf 
demonizing or  at least stereotyping adversaries. We need to 
learn to stop throwing stones. 
Reflecting on the risks of tyranny in a democracy, 
Tocqueville argued: 
Formerly tyranny used the clumsy weapons of chains 
and hangmen; nowadays even despotism, though it seemed to 
have nothing more to learn, has been perfected by civilization. 
Princes made violence a physical thing, but our contem- 
porary democratic republics have turned it into something as  
intellectual as  the human will i t  is intended to constrain. 
Under the absolute government of a single man, despotism, to 
reach the soul, clumsily struck a t  the body, and the soul, 
escaping from such bIows, rose gIorious1y above it; but in 
democratic republics that is not a t  all how tyranny behaves; i t  
leaves the body alone and goes straight for the soul. The mas- 
ter no longer says: Think like me or you die." He does say: 
'You are free not to think as I do; you can keep your life and 
property and all; but from this day you are a stranger among 
US.a152 
We must learn how to conduct dialogue without being or mak- 
ing strangers. We need to learn more of genuine toleration and 
respect. We can care about other people and maintain friend- 
ships even if we deeply disagree. The alliances in recent years 
among the traditionalists are one of the positive lessons we 
have learned. Among other things, this experience has taught 
us the importance of respecting enclaves that various groups 
152. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 3, at 255 (emphasis added). 
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construct to pursue their communal life, as well as the need to 
avoid the facile tolerance of expecting everyone to be pluralistic 
in exactly the same way. 
A great source of hope in dealing with the disintegrating 
discourse around us is to reconstruct and restore the basis for a 
community of discourse capable of establishing lines of commu- 
nication between the competing discourses clamoring around 
us. We may walk partially incommensurable paths, but we 
have too much social experience to take seriously those who 
claim that meaningful inter-group understanding is impossible. 
There are many of us who hear both (or even many) sides. 
Religious intermediary associations can play an extremely 
important role in this process, if we will but let them. The 
genius of democracy is that if we allow open processes and 
continue to listen to persons-not merely t o  stereotypes and to 
reified ideas-we can begin to understand competing visions. If 
we strive to understand and to unleash the transformative yet 
fragile power of religion, we may hope for new visions tran- 
scending those that have gone before. 
